The Algorithmic Structure of Group Strategyproof Budget-Balanced Cost-Sharing Mechanisms

DOI10.1007/11672142_27MaRDI QIDQ5449811zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre

Publication date 19 March 2008

Published in STACS 2006 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/11672142_27

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cited in

(10)

• A Group-Strategyproof Cost Sharing Mechanism for the Steiner Forest Game
• Hardness results for multicast cost sharing.
• Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
• Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences
• Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
• Fair cost-sharing methods for scheduling jobs on parallel machines
• New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms
• Online cooperative cost sharing
• A strongly group strategyproof and shill resistant bargaining mechanism for fog resource pricing
• Cost allocation and strategyproof mechanism for cover-set games

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