Truthful Fair Division

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_25MaRDI QIDQ3162527zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Elchanan Mossel, Omer Tamuz

Publication date 19 October 2010

Published in Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://authors.library.caltech.edu/71908/

zbMATH Keywords

cake cuttingfair divisiontruthful mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Fair Division
• Truthful fair division without free disposal
• Fair (and not so fair) division
• Fair division of indivisible items
• The efficiency of fair division
• Fair division with subsidy
• Fair division with no information

Cites work

• How to Cut A Cake Fairly
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1015852 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1022658 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3097423 (Why is no real title available?)
• On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations
• Sur la division pragmatique
• Truth, justice, and cake cutting

Cited in

(25)

• Sequential analogues of the Lyapunov and Krein-Milman theorems in Fréchet spaces
• Expand the shares together: envy-free mechanisms with a small number of cuts
• Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting
• The return function: a new computable perspective on Bayesian-Nash equilibria
• Fair and square: cake-cutting in two dimensions
• Fair cake-cutting in practice
• Anti-compacts and their applications to analogs of Lyapunov and Lebesgue theorems in Fréchet spaces
• A heuristic optimization of Bayesian incentive-compatible cake-cutting
• On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations
• Truth, justice, and cake cutting
• Strategy-proof cake cutting mechanisms for all-or-nothing utility
• On fair division of a homogeneous good
• Expected outcomes and manipulations in online fair division
• Fair Division
• Mechanisms for fair allocation problems: no-punishment payment rules in verifiable settings
• Fair Cake Division Under Monotone Likelihood Ratios
• A cake for Cournot
• Fairly taking turns
• On existence of truthful fair cake cutting mechanisms
• Guarantees in Fair Division: General or Monotone Preferences
• Monotone and Online Fair Division
• Envy-free cake-cutting for four agents
• The incentive guarantees behind Nash welfare in divisible resources allocation
• Fair and almost truthful mechanisms for additive valuations and beyond
• Truthful fair division without free disposal

This page was built for publication: Truthful Fair Division

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3162527)