Two-player binary global games without dominance solvable states

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2026.04.008MaRDI QIDQ7297095zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors In-Uck Park, Efthymios Smyrniotis

Publication date 15 July 2026

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2026.04.008

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites work

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• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games

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