Using Temporal Dummy Players in Cost-Sharing Games

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-06839-3_9MaRDI QIDQ6165463zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tami Tamir

Publication date 1 August 2023

Published in Recent Advances in Computational Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06839-3_9

zbMATH Keywords

cost-sharing gamesNash equilibriumtemporal dummy players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• Algorithms, games, and the internet
• Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
• Fast convergence of selfish rerouting
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6783389 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the existence of pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games
• On the impact of singleton strategies in congestion games
• Potential games
• Stackelberg Routing on Parallel Networks With Horizontal Queues
• Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
• Stackelberg strategies for atomic congestion games
• The efficiency of best-response dynamics
• The power of one evil secret agent
• The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
• Tight bounds for selfish and greedy load balancing
• Worst-case equilibria

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