Using clock auctions to dissolve partnership: an experimental study

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.12.034MaRDI QIDQ2444448zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Xiangdong Qin, Fangzhou Zhang

Publication date 9 April 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.12.034

zbMATH Keywords

clock auctionpartnership dissolutionrisk aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions
• Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
• Asymmetric price-benefits auctions
• A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
• The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems

Cited in

(7)

• Fear of losing in a clock auction
• Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders
• The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems
• Survival auctions
• Clocks and trees: isomorphic Dutch auctions and centipede games
• Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions
• Partnership dissolution: information and efficiency

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