Vertical foreclosure and multi-segment competition

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2018.04.023MaRDI QIDQ1787678zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bruno Jullien, Markus Reisinger, Patrick Rey

Publication date 5 October 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/26097/1/vertical_foreclosure.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

foreclosurevertical contractingcustomer segmentsdownstream competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Market foreclosure without vertical integration
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Cited in

(5)

• Vertical contracting between a vertically integrated firm and a downstream rival
• The entry incentives of complementary producers: a simple model with implications for antitrust policy
• Market foreclosure without vertical integration
• Vertical integration and market foreclosure with convex downstream costs
• Vertical integration and knowledge disclosure

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