A pricing strategy of e-commerce advertising cooperation in the Stackelberg game model with different market power structure (Q2633285): Difference between revisions

Summary: A lot of research work has studied the auction mechanism of uncertain advertising cooperation between the e-commerce platform and advertisers, but little has focused on pricing strategy in stable advertising cooperation under a certain market power structure. To fill this gap, this paper makes a study of the deep interest distribution of two parties in such cooperation. We propose a pricing strategy by building two stackelberg master-slave models when the e-commerce platform and the advertiser are respectively the leader in the cooperation. It is analyzed that the optimization solution of the profits of both parties and the total system are affected by some main decision factors including the income commission proportion, the advertising product price and the cost of advertising effort of both parties' brand in different dominant models. Then, some numerical studies are used to verify the effectiveness of the models. Finally, we draw a conclusion and make some suggestions to the platforms and the advertisers in the e-commerce advertising cooperation.