On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcomes in plurality games
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Publication:5931926
DOI10.1006/game.1999.0801zbMath0984.91005MaRDI QIDQ5931926
Publication date: 25 September 2001
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0801
91A10: Noncooperative games
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Generic finiteness of outcome distributions for two-person game forms with three outcomes, Costly network formation and regular equilibria, The trembling chairman paradox, On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games, Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games, The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games
Cites Work
- Note on bounds for some determinants
- Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof
- Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
- Sequential Equilibria
- Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
- On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms
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