Hyper-stable social welfare functions

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0908-1zbMath1341.91070OpenAlexW2614573539MaRDI QIDQ5964647

Lainé, Jean, M. Remzi Sanver, Ali Ihsan Ozkes

Publication date: 1 March 2016

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0908-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Representative democracy and the implementation of majority-preferred alternatives ⋮ Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains ⋮ Metrizable preferences over preferences

Cites Work

• Representative democracy and the implementation of majority-preferred alternatives
• Hyper-stable collective rankings
• Self-selective social choice functions
• Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: The use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings
• An example in group preference
• Tournament solutions and majority voting
• Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations
• Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain
• Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
• Majority voting on orders

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