Equilibrium selection with coupled populations in hawk-dove games: theory and experiment in continuous time

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.06.003zbMath1371.91016OpenAlexW2474011848MaRDI QIDQ308644

Hans-Theo Normann, Ismael Martínez-Martínez, Volker Benndorf

Publication date: 6 September 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.06.003

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicsevolutionary game theoryhawk-dove gameexperiment in continuous time

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (6)

Perturbed best response dynamics in a hawk-dove game ⋮ Coordination and evolutionary dynamics: when are evolutionary models reliable? ⋮ An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics ⋮ Equilibrium selection in hawk-dove games ⋮ Asymmetric adaptivity induces recurrent synchronization in complex networks ⋮ Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time

Uses Software

• ORSEE

Cites Work

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