Global refunding and climate change
Publication:311034
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2012.06.001zbMath1345.91057OpenAlexW3122804467MaRDI QIDQ311034
Publication date: 28 September 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2012.06.001
climate change mitigationglobal refunding schemeincentive-compatible mechanismsinternational agreements
Applications of game theory (91A80) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)
Related Items (3)
Cites Work
- Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games
- Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
- Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
- The economics of controlling stock pollutants: An efficient strategy for greenhouse gases
- Stable coalition structures with externalities
- Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction
- A climate agreement with full participation
- Regional versus global cooperation for climate control
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