Enriching information to prevent bank runs

DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0907-6zbMath1367.91136OpenAlexW1504230660MaRDI QIDQ315791

Ricardo De O. Cavalcanti, Paulo Klinger Monteiro

Publication date: 23 September 2016

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/8484

zbMATH Keywords

bank runssequential serviceDiamond-Dybvig model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (8)

Financial fragility and over-the-counter markets ⋮ Enriching information to prevent bank runs ⋮ Currency stability using blockchain technology ⋮ Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public ⋮ Run theorems for low returns and large banks ⋮ Preventing runs under sequential revelation of liquidity needs ⋮ Bank runs with many small banks and mutual guarantees at the terminal stage ⋮ Optimal banking contracts and financial fragility

Cites Work

• Deposit insurance and bank liquidation without commitment: can we sleep well?
• Enriching information to prevent bank runs
• Run theorems for low returns and large banks
• Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation
• Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation
• Perfect Bayesian implementation
• The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
• Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable: A Reply
• Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms

This page was built for publication: Enriching information to prevent bank runs