Large population limits for evolutionary dynamics with random matching
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Publication:367482
DOI10.1007/s13235-011-0037-0zbMath1273.91059OpenAlexW2058617427MaRDI QIDQ367482
Publication date: 16 September 2013
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0037-0
Applications of game theory (91A80) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Cites Work
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- Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
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- Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
- Orders of limits for stationary distributions, stochastic dominance, and stochastic stability
- Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- A Measure of Asymptotic Efficiency for Tests of a Hypothesis Based on the sum of Observations
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