Core extensions for non-balanced TU-games
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Publication:532645
DOI10.1007/s00182-008-0135-4zbMath1211.91028MaRDI QIDQ532645
Juan Camilo Gómez, Camelia Bejan
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0135-4
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