Generalized correlated equilibrium for two-person games in extensive form with perfect information
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Publication:539469
DOI10.1007/s10100-010-0142-yzbMath1213.91034OpenAlexW2045254580MaRDI QIDQ539469
Publication date: 30 May 2011
Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-010-0142-y
2-person games (91A05) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33) Games in extensive form (91A18)
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Cites Work
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