Average tree solutions and the distribution of Harsanyi dividends

DOI10.1007/s00182-010-0245-7zbMath1220.91010MaRDI QIDQ548073

Richard Baron, Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal

Publication date: 28 June 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17909/1/MPRA_paper_17909.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

BFS; Shapley value; DFS; average tree solutions; communication situations; equal surplus division; Harsanyi solutions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91A43: Games involving graphs

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