Three minimal market institutions with human and algorithmic agents: theory and experimental evidence

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.01.010zbMath1200.91124MaRDI QIDQ608544

Juergen Huber, Martin Shubik, Shyam Sunder

Publication date: 25 November 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d16/d1623-r.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

general equilibrium; strategic market games; laboratory experiments; adaptive learning agents; minimally intelligent agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91A90: Experimental studies

Related Items

From general equilibrium to Schumpeter, Sufficiency of an outside bank and a default penalty to support the value of fiat money: experimental evidence

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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