Three minimal market institutions with human and algorithmic agents: theory and experimental evidence
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Publication:608544
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.01.010zbMath1200.91124MaRDI QIDQ608544
Juergen Huber, Martin Shubik, Shyam Sunder
Publication date: 25 November 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d16/d1623-r.pdf
general equilibrium; strategic market games; laboratory experiments; adaptive learning agents; minimally intelligent agents
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A90: Experimental studies
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