Aggregation of multiple prior opinions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:654529
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.018zbMath1239.91031MaRDI QIDQ654529
Itzhak Gilboa, Nicolas Vieille, Hervé Crès
Publication date: 28 December 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09iepso50rh/resources/111cres-giloboa-vieille.pdf
62C10: Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures
91B06: Decision theory
91B16: Utility theory
Related Items
The ex ante aggregation of opinions under uncertainty, Harsanyi's theorem without the sure-thing principle: on the consistent aggregation of monotonic Bernoullian and Archimedean preferences, Separate aggregation of beliefs and values under ambiguity, Rawls's difference principle and maximin rule of allocation: a new analysis, Utilitarianism with and without expected utility, When upper conditional probabilities are conditional possibility measures, Aggregation of opinions in networks of individuals and collectives, Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form, Learning under unawareness, Dynamic consistency and ambiguity: a reappraisal, Aggregation of experts' opinions and conditional consensus opinion by the Steiner point, Smooth aggregation of Bayesian experts, Aggregation of opinions and risk measures, Understanding time-inconsistent heterogeneous preferences in economics and finance: a practice theory approach, Fair management of social risk, Decisions with conflicting and imprecise information
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Rationality of belief or: why Savage's axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality
- Attitude toward imprecise information
- Representation and aggregation of preferences under uncertainty
- Combining probability distributions: A critique and an annotated bibliography
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Uncertainty aversion in nonprobabilistic decision models
- Knightian decision theory. I.
- Consistent Bayesian aggregation
- When does aggregation reduce risk aversion?
- Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto
- Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
- Ambiguity and the Bayesian Paradigm
- Uncertainty Aversion with Second-Order Utilities and Probabilities
- Ambiguity and Second-Order Belief
- Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
- The Opinion Pool
- Normal Bayesian Dialogues
- The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
- Marginalization and Linear Opinion Pools
- Integral Representation Without Additivity
- A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity
- Truth and Simplicity
- A Definition of Subjective Probability