Coalition formation and potential games

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0846zbMATH Open1037.91010OpenAlexW2102900308MaRDI QIDQ700088FDOQ700088

Marco Slikker

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/17699c24d64eeba57bf6b3f3cd5abdcaae3e6000

zbMATH Keywords

Coalition formationEquilibrium uniqueness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Potential games
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• A Shapley value representation of potential games
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Potential maximizers and network formation
• Endogenous formation of cooperation structures
• Strong equilibria in claim games corresponding to convex games.
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Cited In (9)

• Alliances and negotiations
• Stable governments and the semistrict core
• Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements
• POTENTIAL MAXIMIZATION AND COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMATION
• Subgame perfect coalition formation
• The cutting power of preparation
• Potentials and reduced games for share functions
• Colonel Blotto game with coalition formation for sharing resources
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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