Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation
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Publication:705896
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.12.001zbMath1117.91331MaRDI QIDQ705896
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.12.001
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- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage