Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.013zbMath1279.91087OpenAlexW2091655127MaRDI QIDQ765216

Jingfeng Lu

Publication date: 19 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.013

zbMATH Keywords

auction designcharity auctioncross shareholdingseffective paymentsfinancial externalitiespayment-coefficient matrix

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings ⋮ An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values ⋮ Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions

Cites Work

• Contests with rank-order spillovers
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• Auctions with cross-shareholdings
• Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings
• Cross-owned firms competing in auctions
• Participation costs and efficient auctions
• Auctions with financial externalities
• Optimal Auction Design
• Notes and Comments the Amsterdam Auction
• Determining damages from the operation of bidding rings: an analysis of the post-auction ``knockout sale.
• Unnamed Item

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