Evolution of behavior when duopolists choose prices and quantities

DOI10.1007/S13235-019-00325-ZzbMath1444.91096OpenAlexW95315752MaRDI QIDQ778092

Abhimanyu Khan, Ronald J. A. P. Peeters

Publication date: 30 June 2020

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1630278/guid-43baa9c3-c947-4214-997b-695f8fa390e4-ASSET1.0.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

duopolyimitationhorizontal differentiationlong-run stabilityprice-quantity competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Cites Work

• General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions
• Duopoly with price and quantity as strategic variables
• Endogenously determined price rigidities
• How noise matters.
• Stochastically stable states in an oligopoly with differentiated goods: Equivalence of price and quantity strategies
• An evolutionary model of Bertrand oligopoly
• Imitation by price and quantity setting firms in a differentiated market
• Long run equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly.
• Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities.
• Imitation-theory and experimental evidence
• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
• Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints

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