Repeated moral hazard with persistence

DOI10.1007/s00199-004-0488-2zbMath1093.91032OpenAlexW2003535680MaRDI QIDQ813229

Toshihiko Mukoyama, Ayşegül Şahin

Publication date: 31 January 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/01-2004-cah.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

human capitalunemployment insurance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (8)

Relational contracts in a persistent environment ⋮ Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality-based approach ⋮ Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence ⋮ Optimal insurance contracts for a shot-noise Cox claim process and persistent insured's actions ⋮ A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection ⋮ Stock grants as a commitment device ⋮ Design, analysis and simulation of an optimal wage contract in firms ⋮ Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover

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