Analysis and shifting of stochastically stable equilibria for evolutionary snowdrift games
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Publication:888803
DOI10.1016/j.sysconle.2015.08.004zbMath1322.93101OpenAlexW1470661991MaRDI QIDQ888803
Haili Liang, Ming Cao, Xiao Fan Wang
Publication date: 2 November 2015
Published in: Systems \& Control Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sysconle.2015.08.004
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Uses Software
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