Endogenous transfers in the prisoner's dilemma game: an experimental test of cooperation and coordination
From MaRDI portal
Publication:926787
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.010zbMath1134.91347OpenAlexW2139698638MaRDI QIDQ926787
Gary Charness, Cheng-Zhong Qin, Guillaume R. Fréchette
Publication date: 21 May 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9cm846c4
equilibrium selectioncoordination gamesCoase theoremprisoner's dilemmacompensation mechanismendogenous transfer payments
Related Items (11)
Asymmetric voluntary cooperation: a repeated sequential best-shot experiment ⋮ Information transparency and equilibrium selection in coordination games: an experimental study ⋮ Approval mechanism to solve prisoner's dilemma: comparison with Varian's compensation mechanism ⋮ Gender, emotions, and tournament performance in the laboratory ⋮ Cooperation in a dynamical adjustment of duopoly game with incomplete information ⋮ Choice overload, coordination and inequality: three hurdles to the effectiveness of the compensation mechanism? ⋮ The UN in the lab ⋮ Social surplus determines cooperation rates in the one-shot prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability ⋮ Agreements with reciprocity: co-financing and MOUs ⋮ External pressure on alliances: what does the prisoners' dilemma reveal?
Uses Software
Cites Work
- Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
- Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Preplay contracting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
- Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
- Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players
This page was built for publication: Endogenous transfers in the prisoner's dilemma game: an experimental test of cooperation and coordination
