Learning in games with strategic complementarities revisited

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.007zbMath1152.91368OpenAlexW2076621463MaRDI QIDQ960258

Ulrich Berger

Publication date: 16 December 2008

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://epub.wu.ac.at/5589/1/2008_JET.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

learning processfictitious playstrategic complementaritiesordinal complementarities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (11)

On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play ⋮ Non-algebraic convergence proofs for continuous-time fictitious play ⋮ On the rate of convergence of fictitious play ⋮ History as a coordination device ⋮ Robustness Properties in Fictitious-Play-Type Algorithms ⋮ The logit dynamic in supermodular games with a continuum of strategies: a deterministic approximation approach ⋮ Learning in monotone Bayesian games ⋮ Independent learning in stochastic games ⋮ Fictitious play in networks ⋮ Fictitious play in \(3 \times 3\) games: chaos and dithering behaviour ⋮ Payoff performance of fictitious play

Cites Work

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