The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.010zbMath1158.91316MaRDI QIDQ1007327

Ben McQuillin

Publication date: 20 March 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.010

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley value; recursion; externalities; coalition structure; partition function games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

An Extension of the Solidarity Value for Environments with Externalities, On the centrality analysis of covert networks using games with externalities, Coalition formation in games with externalities, Nash bargaining solution under externalities, Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities, Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues, Values for environments with externalities -- the average approach, The stochastic Shapley value for coalitional games with externalities, Balanced externalities and the Shapley value, Evaluating groups with the generalized Shapley value, Coalition formation in collaborative production and transportation with competing firms, On convexity in cooperative games with externalities, Fair division in the presence of externalities, Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies, Marginality and convexity in partition function form games, Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games, On the externality-free Shapley-Shubik index

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• A set of axioms for a value for partition function games
• Values of games in partition function form
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES
• Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• N‐person games in partition function form