Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1021601
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.007zbMath1161.91373MaRDI QIDQ1021601
Debasis Mishra, David C. Parkes
Publication date: 8 June 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.007
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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