Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences
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Publication:1036099
DOI10.1007/s11238-007-9066-yzbMath1186.91097MaRDI QIDQ1036099
Burak Can, M. Remzi Sanver, Bora Erdamar
Publication date: 4 November 2009
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9066-y
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