Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games

DOI10.1007/s11238-007-9083-xzbMath1192.91024MaRDI QIDQ1036101

Yukihiko Funaki, René van den Brink

Publication date: 4 November 2009

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9083-x

zbMATH Keywords

equal division solution; TU-games; equal surplus sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

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