Notes on naive semantics
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Publication:1050329
DOI10.1007/BF00302339zbMath0513.03003OpenAlexW2049250683MaRDI QIDQ1050329
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00302339
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