Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of effectivity functions

DOI10.1007/BF01769887zbMath0567.90101MaRDI QIDQ1060137

Hans Keiding

Publication date: 1985

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitynecessary and sufficient conditioneffectivity function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (16)

Stable effectivity functions with an infinity of players and alternatives ⋮ Stability of topological effectivity functions ⋮ Perfect graphs are kernel solvable ⋮ Stability and index of the meet game on a lattice ⋮ The structure of unstable power mechanisms ⋮ Perfect graphs, kernels, and cores of cooperative games ⋮ Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice ⋮ On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms. ⋮ Stable effectivity functions and perfect graphs ⋮ Computational complexity to verify the unstability of effectivity function ⋮ A stability index for local effectivity functions ⋮ On effectivity functions of game forms ⋮ Necessary and sufficient conditions for l-stability of games in constitutional form ⋮ Stable families of coalitions and normal hypergraphs ⋮ Decomposable effectivity functions ⋮ Interaction sheaves on continuous domains

Cites Work

• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory

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