On incentive compatible, individually rational, and ex post efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90074-4zbMath0678.90017OpenAlexW2078610441MaRDI QIDQ1124510

Toshihide Matsuo

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90074-4

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingsellerprivate valuesbuyerBayesian incentive computabilityex post efficient mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (8)

Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade ⋮ Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs ⋮ Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments ⋮ Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms ⋮ Robust bilateral trade with discrete types ⋮ Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values ⋮ Collusion-proof and fair auctions ⋮ On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading

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