Sealed bid auctions with uncertainty averse bidders

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Publication:1128223

DOI10.1007/s001990050209zbMath0911.90130OpenAlexW2074276405MaRDI QIDQ1128223

Kin Chung Lo

Publication date: 5 May 1999

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050209




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