Viscous population equilibria

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(91)90007-2zbMath0751.90088OpenAlexW2053528922MaRDI QIDQ1192638

Roger B. Myerson, Jeroen M. Swinkels, Gregory B. Pollock

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/906.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

viscositybiological populationViscosityevolutionary stable strategiesbiological gamesfluid population equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) 2-person games (91A05) Viscosity solutions to Hamilton-Jacobi equations in optimal control and differential games (49L25)

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Cites Work

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• Persistent equilibria in strategic games
• Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Non-cooperative games
• Sequential Equilibria
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria