The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections
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Publication:1278562
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(95)00804-7zbMath0921.90042OpenAlexW1977067739WikidataQ55895654 ScholiaQ55895654MaRDI QIDQ1278562
Sven Berg, Frédéric Chantreuil, Dominique Lepelley
Publication date: 17 September 1999
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(95)00804-7
Related Items (6)
Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions ⋮ IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report ⋮ Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French presidential elections ⋮ Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation ⋮ Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules ⋮ Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules
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- Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
- The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
- On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
- Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- On probability models in voting theory
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