Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists: Incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1300369
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00049-9zbMath0937.91051OpenAlexW1985207685WikidataQ127125222 ScholiaQ127125222MaRDI QIDQ1300369
Frank H. jun. Page, Paulo Klinger Monteiro
Publication date: 10 May 2000
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(97)00049-9
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (10)
A necessary optimality condition in two-dimensional screening ⋮ The monopolist's problem: existence, relaxation, and approximation ⋮ Existence of solutions to principal-agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions ⋮ Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach ⋮ Complementary monopolies with asymmetric information ⋮ When is multidimensional screening a convex program? ⋮ Convexity and multi-dimensional screening for spaces with different dimensions ⋮ A general existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection ⋮ Existence in multidimensional screening with general nonlinear preferences ⋮ Dangerous tangents: an application of \(\Gamma\)-convergence to the control of dynamical systems
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
- A note on Fatou's lemma in several dimensions
- Convex analysis and measurable multifunctions
- A selection theorem for optimization problems
- Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard
- Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection
- Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
- Monopoly pricing
- A new proof of the existence of equilibrium in incomplete market economies
- Measurable relations
- Measurable Selection and Dynamic Programming
- Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
This page was built for publication: Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists: Incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints