The equilibrium allocation of investment capital in the presence of adverse selection and costly state verification
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Publication:1341443
DOI10.1007/BF01209695zbMath0820.90002MaRDI QIDQ1341443
Publication date: 5 January 1995
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01209695
91B50: General equilibrium theory
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Cites Work
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- Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem