A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(96)00805-1zbMath0875.90014MaRDI QIDQ1350573

Sungwhee Shin, Sang-Chul Suh

Publication date: 27 February 1997

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(96)00805-1

zbMATH Keywords

Matching; Stable rule; Strong Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

Dynamically stable matching, Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem, Profit-maximizing matchmaker, The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation, Matching markets under (in)complete information, Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money, Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems, Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities, The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets, Games of manipulation in marriage problems, Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets, Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems., Strong implementation with partially honest individuals, Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets, Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms, When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results

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