Evolution and long run equilibria in coordination games with summary statistic payoff technologies

DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2274zbMath0899.90173OpenAlexW2011323934MaRDI QIDQ1367769

Jack Robles

Publication date: 5 November 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2274

zbMATH Keywords

class coordination gamesset of long run equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (2)

Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies ⋮ Evolution with changing mutation rates

Cites Work

• An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
• Stochastic stability in games with alternative best replies
• Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

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