How noise matters.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00554-7zbMath1056.91011MaRDI QIDQ1408710

Lawrence E. Blume

Publication date: 25 September 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theory; random matching paradigm; two-strategy population games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A22: Evolutionary games

91B68: Matching models

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