Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions
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Publication:1414411
DOI10.1007/s001820100087zbMath1083.91008OpenAlexW1993924634MaRDI QIDQ1414411
Aner Sela, Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Ram Orzach
Publication date: 23 November 2003
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820100087
differential informationwinner's cursedominant strategiescommon-value second-price auctionsinformation superiority
Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps, Information in Tullock contests, Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information, Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information, The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly., Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values, Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions, Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information, Information advantage in Cournot oligopoly