Timing and virtual observability in ultimatum bargaining and ``weak link coordination games

DOI10.1023/A:1026257921046zbMath1097.91503MaRDI QIDQ1430264

Colin F. Camerer, Roberto A. Weber, Marc J. Knez

Publication date: 27 May 2004

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

experimentscoordination gamestiming

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games in extensive form (91A18)

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