The signaling value of punishing norm-breakers and rewarding norm-followers
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Publication:1712184
DOI10.3390/g9040102zbMath1419.91133OpenAlexW2904464630MaRDI QIDQ1712184
Fabrizio Adriani, Silvia Sonderegger
Publication date: 21 January 2019
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040102
Related Items (2)
Call to action: intrinsic motives and material interests ⋮ The signaling value of punishing norm-breakers and rewarding norm-followers
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