Null, nullifying, and necessary agents: parallel characterizations of the Banzhaf and Shapley values
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Publication:1730788
DOI10.1007/s10957-018-1403-5zbMath1419.91032OpenAlexW2893539232WikidataQ129153150 ScholiaQ129153150MaRDI QIDQ1730788
Julián Costa, José M. Alonso-Meijide, Ignacio Garcia-Jurado
Publication date: 6 March 2019
Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-018-1403-5
Related Items (4)
New characterizations and a concept of potential for each multinomial (probabilistic) value ⋮ Parallel axiomatizations of weighted and multiweighted Shapley values, random order values, and the Harsanyi set ⋮ Weak null, necessary defender and necessary detractor players: characterizations of the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues ⋮ Necessary players and values
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