Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions
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Publication:1735737
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.07.010zbMath1419.91135OpenAlexW3121799312WikidataQ129182576 ScholiaQ129182576MaRDI QIDQ1735737
Publication date: 29 March 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/14-019.pdf
Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Related Items (3)
Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes ⋮ Seller experimentation and trade ⋮ Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types
Cites Work
- Noisy signaling: theory and experiment
- Optimal entry timing
- Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with switched effort levels
- Dynamic signaling and market breakdown
- Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons
- Reputation in Continuous-Time Games
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
- Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons
- Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- The Optimal Level of Experimentation
- Trading Dynamics with Private Buyer Signals in the Market for Lemons
- Search With Adverse Selection
- Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers
- Who Wants a Good Reputation?
- Introduction to Partial Differential Equations
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