Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.04.013zbMath1397.91068OpenAlexW3126002686WikidataQ47979682 ScholiaQ47979682MaRDI QIDQ1784806

Florian Morath, Kai A. Konrad

Publication date: 27 September 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.tax.mpg.de/RePEc/mpi/wpaper/Tax-MPG-RPS-2011-07.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilityconflictaltruismspiteindirect evolutionary approach

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Group preferences (91B10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (4)

Tag-based spite with correlated interactions ⋮ Bargaining with incomplete information: evolutionary stability in finite populations ⋮ Prejudice, privilege, and power: conflicts and cooperation between recognizable groups ⋮ Evolutionarily stable in-group altruism in intergroup conflict over (local) public goods

Cites Work

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• The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair allocations
• Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining.
• The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences.
• Strategy selection in structured populations
• Group selection: the quest for social preferences
• Why do you hate me?: On the survival of spite.
• The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Evolution of Preferences1
• On the evolution of individualistic preferences: An incomplete information scenario

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