The demand bargaining set: General characterization and application to majority games

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00532-8zbMath1032.91021MaRDI QIDQ1811555

Massimo Morelli, Maria Montero

Publication date: 17 June 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00532-8

zbMATH Keywords

Majority games; Bargaining sets; Proportional payoffs; Stable demands; Undominated coalition structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games, A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability, Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel., Coalitional games and contracts based on individual deviations, An adaptive model of demand adjustment in weighted majority games, USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION

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