A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00036-4zbMath1032.91020MaRDI QIDQ1810697

François Maniquet

Publication date: 9 June 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley value; equal responsibility; Impatience independence; Queueing problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

90B22: Queues and service in operations research

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