On the core of an economy with differential information

DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2673zbMath1013.91078OpenAlexW2010443788MaRDI QIDQ1841182

Ezra Einy, Benyamin Shitovitz, Diego Moreno

Publication date: 13 July 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4394

zbMATH Keywords

rational equilibriumfine coreatomless exchange economyeconomy with differential information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60)

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Cites Work

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• Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
• Rational expectations equilibria and the ex-post core of an economy with asymmetric information.
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• Generic Existence of Completely Revealing Equilibria for Economies with Uncertainty when Prices Convey Information
• Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
• Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders